Yawnjacking

So, I was asked to comment about clickjacking today. Technically, it isn’t a new vulnerability (IE6 fixed a variant in 2004, Firefox fixed a variant in September 2008), but a refinement of previous exploits and ennobled with a catchier name. It gained widespread coverage in October 2008 prior to the OWASP NYC conference when Jeremiah Grossman and Robert Hansen first said they would describe the vulnerability, then cancelled their talk for fear of unleashing Yet Another Exploit of Ultimate Doom.* The updated technique combines devious DOM manipulation with well-established attack patterns to make a respectable type of attack.

I still hope that this doesn’t make it into the OWASP Top 10. (I’ll explain why elsewhere.)
Anyway, in the interest of further polluting the internet with opinionated cruft, here’s more information about clickjacking:
Clickjacking tricks a user into clicking on an attacker-supplied page while the user only sees the appearance and effect of clicking on a plain link. The attacker identifies an area in the target HTML that should receive the click event. This HTML is placed within an IFRAME such that the X and Y offsets of the frame place the target area in the upper left-hand corner of the frame’s visible area. This target IFRAME is visually hidden from the user (though the element remains part of the DOM). Then, the IFRAME is set within a second page (the content of which doesn’t matter) beneath the mouse cursor and, very importantly, dynamically moves to always be underneath the mouse. Then, when the user clicks somewhere within the second page the click is actually sent to the target area even though it appears to the user that the mouse is only above some innocuous link.
Essentially, an attacker chooses some web page that, if the victim clicked some point (link, button, etc.) on that page, would produce some benefit to the attacker (e.g. generate click-fraud revenue, change a security setting, etc.). Next, the attacker takes the target page and places a second, innocuous page over it. The trick is to get the victim to make a mouse click on what appeared to be the innocuous page, but was actually an invisible element of the target page that has been automatically, but invisbly, placed beneath the cursor.
The attack relies on luring a user to a server under the attacker’s control or a site that has been compromised by the attacker. Web site owners who ensure their site is free of cross-site scripting or other vulnerabilities can prevent their sites from being used as a relay point for the attacker. Yet other successful attacks, such as phishing, also rely on luring users to a server under the attacker’s control. The relative success of phishing implies that just securing web applications at the server isn’t the only solution because users can be tricked into visiting malicious web sites.
The core of the attack occurs in the browser, which is where the real fix needs to appear. The problem is that browsers are intended to handle HTML from many sources and provide mechanisms to manipulate the location and visibility of elements within a web page. Consequently, any solution would have to block this attack while not inhibiting legitimate uses of this functionality.
*Yes, I made you scroll all the way down here to get the link. How evil is that?

The Internet is dead! Long live the Internet!

In 1998, L0pht claimed before Congress that in under 30 minutes their seven member group could make online porn and Trek fan sites unusable for several days. (That’s all that existed on the Internet in 1998.) In February 2002 an SNMP vulnerability threatened the very fabric of space and time (at least as it related to porn and Trek fan sites — if you still don’t believe me, consider that Google added Klingon language support the same month). More recently, a DNS vulnerability was (somewhat re-)discovered that could enable attackers to redirect traffic going to sites like google.com and wikipedia.com to sites that served porn, even though many people wouldn’t notice the difference. (Dan Kaminsky compiled a list of other apocalyptic vulnerabilities similar to the issues that plagued DNS.)

This year at the OWASP NYC AppSec 2008 Conference Jeremiah Grossman and Robert “RSnake” Hansen shared another vulnerability, clickjacking, in the Voldemort “He Who Must Not Be Named” style. In other words, yet another eschatonic vulnerability existed, but its details could not be shared. This disclosure method continued the trend from Black Hat 2008 prior to which the media and security discussion lists talked about the secretly-held, unsecretly-guessed DNS vulnerability information with the speculation usually retained for important things like when Gn’Fn’R would finally release Chinese Democracy. [If you don’t care about gory details of the disclosure drama and just want to skim the abattoir, then read this summary.]

Yet none of these doom-laden vulnerabilities have caused to Internet to go pfft like a certain parrot that need not be named.

Until now.
I’ve discovered a web-based vulnerability that can be trivially exploited called Cross-Hype Attack Forgery Exploit (CHAFE). It affects all web browsers and can’t be patched (nor will you be protected by FireFox’s NoScript or using lynx). In fact, if you’re reading this entry then I guarantee you can be vulnerable to it. Public release of the details would be self-defeating, but I’m willing to sell the details to the highest bidder — as well as anyone else who wants to pay for the information. To ensure the validity of this vulnerability, consider that it has both “cross” and “forgery” in the name. So, it clearly has a working exploit associated with it. No peer review is necessary to establish the vulnerability’s credibility. To build further confidence, I’ll hint that the vulnerability builds on prior research, but who really cares about dusty problems from 1991 when you can have a working exploit in 2008?
Since I haven’t gotten around to creating PayPal account yet (although a reminder to update my account information just arrived in my InBox a few moments ago), send an e-mail to chafe@hackculture.com if you’re interested in the details and you have some money from which you’d like to be departed.

Good morning, Worm, Your Honor

[This was originally posted August 2003 on the now-defunct vulns.com site before the Samy worm and sophisticated XSS attacks appeared. In the five years since this was first posted, web applications still struggle with fixing XSS and SQL injection vulnerabilities. In fact, it’s still possible to discover web sites that put raw SQL statements in URL parameters.]

With the advent of the Windows RPC-based worm, security pros once again loudly lament the lack of patched servers, security-aware power users once again loudly blast Microsoft for (insert favorite negative adverb here) written code, and company parking lots at midnight still have a few sticker-laden cars of sysadmins fixing the problem. Of course, there are a few differences such as Joe and Jane’s home computers have been caught red-handed showing vulnerable ports (unlike SQL Slammer or the IIS worm of the month which targeted servers not usually found in home networks), but the usual suspects still linger.

In fact, we could diverge onto many different topics when talking about worms. For starters, what’s the point of arguing against full disclosure when worms arise weeks (SQL Slammer, our RPC friend) or months (Nimda and Code Red) AFTER the patch has been released? Obviously, that sidesteps many arguments against full-disclosure but it’s food for thought. What about the plethora of port scanners and one-time “freebie scanners” that security companies pump out to capitalize the hysteria? Yes, there are administrators who don’t know what’s on their network, but I’m willing to bet there’s a larger number of administrators trying to figure out how to test, update, and manage a patch for 100, 1,000, or 5,000+ systems. You can’t release a patch and expect it to be applied to 1,000 servers within 24 hours. The tools to manage the patch process are too few, while the number of scanners is overwhelming. That’s not to say that security scanning isn’t necessary — it’s just a small part of the process. Administrators need help with patch testing, installation, and management.

Okay, so I’ve diverged onto a few topics already; but the one I wanted to highlight is what happens when a worm exploits a Web Application vulnerability? Cgisecurity.com has a nice essay on one concept of such a worm. How easily could one spread? It may not be hard with a SQL injection and xp_cmdshell(). Who will be the scapegoat? It probably won’t involve cute references to “Billy Gates.” You can’t blame administrators for not being able to download a universal patch (although some ISAPI filters or Apache modules could prevent a lot of attacks). In the end, you have to return to the programmers. They must be aware that Web applications have vulnerabilities that don’t fall into the bloated category of “Buffer Overflow.”

Buffer overflows are sexy to report when they involve popular software. Plus, it’s nice to see a group doing security research for fun. Yet when a worm finally targets Web applications, nmap and vulnerability scanners in the nature of nikto or nessus probably won’t cut it when administrators want to check if their Web applications are vulnerable. Instead, they’ll want web application-aware tools to check live systems and code review tools to audit the source code. The proliferation of buffer overflows has led to some useful code review tools and compilers that can spot a minority of potential overflow vulnerabilities. The OWASP is a good start. Hopefully, the tools to audit web applications and review source code will reach a point so that the next worm won’t spread through e-commerce applications. Everyone talks about how much worse a buffer overflow-based worm could have been, but a worm that gathers passwords and collects credit card numbers from an e-commerce application has more implications for the average Internet user than a worm erasing a company’s hard drives.

So…so you think you can tell

[This was originally posted July 2003 on the now-defunct vulns.com site. Even several years later no web application scanner can automatically identify such vulnerabilities in a reliable, accurate manner — many vulnerabilities still require human analysis.]

Sit and listen to Pink Floyd’s album, Wish You Were Here. “Can you tell a green field from a cold steel rail?” Yes. Could you tell a buffer overflow from a valid username in a Web application? Yes again. What about SQL injection, cross-site scripting, directory traversal attacks, or appending “.bak” to every file? Once again, Yes. In fact, many of these attacks have common signatures that could be thrown into Snort or passed through a simple grep command when examining application log files. These are the vulnerabilities that are reported most often on sites like www.cgisecurity.com or www.securityfocus.com. And they pop up for good reason: they’re dangerous and quickly cripple an e-commerce application.

On the other hand, a different category of attacks has not yet crept far enough into the awareness of security administrators and application programmers: session attacks. There are several reasons for this relative obscurity. No automated tool does a proper job of identifying session vulnerabilities without customization to the application. There are no defined signatures to try, as opposed to the simpler single quote insertion for a SQL injection test. Most importantly, session state vulnerabilities vary significantly between applications.
The consequence of session attacks is no less severe than a good SQL injection that hits xp_cmdshell. Consider last May’s Passport advisory in which an attacker could harvest passwords with tools no more sophisticated than a Web browser. The attack relies on selecting proper values for the “em” (victim’s e-mail) and “prefem” (attacker’s e-mail) parameters to the emailpwdreset.srf file. It should really be stressed that nowhere in this attack were invalid characters sent to the server. Both parameters were attacked, but the payload contained valid e-mail addresses – not e-mail addresses with single quotes, long strings, Unicode encoded characters, or other nefarious items.

The attack succeeded for two major reasons. The e-mail addresses are exposed to the client, rather than tracked on the server in a session object. The four steps ostensibly required for a user to complete the password reminder process did not have to be performed in sequential order, which demonstrates lack of a strong state mechanism.

It seems that most buffer overflow-style attacks against operating systems or Internet servers such as IIS or Apache have led to site defacements or denial of service attacks. Yet as e-commerce has grown with Web applications, so have the vulnerabilities moved on from buffer overflows. Plus, the attacks against Web applications no longer lead to site defacement, but to identity or financial theft (credit cards). Thus, vulnerabilities that used to affect only the server’s owners (and perhaps annoy users who can’t access the service for a period) now include Web application vulnerabilities that quite directly affect users.
As administrators and programmers, we need to be aware of all the vulnerabilities that crop up in Web applications – not just the easy (yet still important!) ones that currently populate the Web vulnerability encyclopedia.